WAIVER: THE QUEST FOR FUNCTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON HABEAS CORPUS
JURISDICTION
John J. Gibbons*
The availability of federal habeas corpus relief has historically
turned upon a choice between the competing ends of justice in the
individual case and the sound administration of justice in the broad
spectrum of cases, between the rights of a criminal defendant who has
been prejudiced in some manner in the past and the needs of a system
which flounders without finality. This observation is hardly original.
Yet despite the familiarity of the problem, the federal courts have
followed strange paths to achieve an equitable and workable balance.
The following discussion focuses on the evolution, meaning and utility
of the standard currently prevailing in this area-waiver.
In Fay v. NoiaI a petitioner, convicted after his coerced confession
was admitted at trial and imprisoned in New York, sought federal
habeas corpus relief. He had failed to appeal his conviction within the
time permitted by New York law. The state denied him post-conviction
relief with respect to the coerced confession claim because the trial
court's admitted error in receiving the confession in evidence had not
been appealed. In an opinion which has been aptly described as "one
2
of the bright landmarks in the administration of criminal justice,"
the Supreme Court held that the existence of this adequate and independent state procedural ground, on which the state relied in refusing
to consider the merits of the federal constitutional question, was no bar
to federal habeas corpus relief. It held, moreover, that petitioner's
failure to appeal his conviction was not such failure to exhaust "the
remedies available in the courts of the State" as is specified by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. That statutory requirement was construed to apply only to
state remedies still open at the time of the federal habeas corpus application.3
An appreciation of the significance of Fay v. Noia requires a brief
0 Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
2 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 235 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
8 The district court denied relief because petitioner had failed to appeal. It construed
the exhaustion mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) as applicable even to state remedies
no longer available. United States v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The court
of appeals questioned this holding, but held that in any event exceptional circumstances
warranted disregard of the exhaustion requirement. 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962).
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review of the history of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. The earlier
notion was that the writ would issue only when the tribunal which
entered the judgment of conviction lacked jurisdiction over the
person or the cause. 4 Once the habeas court found that the judgment of
conviction had been made by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
availability of the writ ceased. Gradually, however, the meaning of
"lack of jurisdiction" was expanded. Where, for example, double
jeopardy -appeared as a matter of record, the convicting court was
deemed to have been without jurisdiction. 5 Where the charge was
obtained without a grand jury indictment, the resulting conviction was
held to lack a jurisdictional basis.6 A mob dominated court also lacked
jurisdiction.7 "Jurisdiction of the convicting court" became an increasingly tenuous test for determining the availability of collateral relief
against judgments of conviction. The concept reached its point of
greatest attenuation in Johnson v. Zerbst,8 where it was held that a
federal trial court had no jurisdiction over a defendant who was denied
the assistance of counsel. Finally in Waley v. Johnston,9 the jurisdictional fiction was abandoned. Thereafter, until Fay v. Noia, the existence of an independent state ground which barred consideration of
4 See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879):
The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special
statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over
the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.
5 Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887);
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
6 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
7 The Court's approach to the mob domination case was not always consistent.
Compare Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) with Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915). Application of the jurisdictional fiction in Moore v. Dempsey was probably influenced by the 1916 reduction in the nondiscretionary appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the consequent need to broaden the availability of collateral relief.
Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 237, 39 Stat. 726. After 1916 a state prisoner was entitled
to Supreme Court review as of right only with respect to claims involving the constitutionality of a statute. Other claims were reviewable only by certiorari.
8 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
9 316 U.S. 101 (1942). The per curiam opinion deals with a coerced guilty plea. The
Court said:
In such circumstances the use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases
where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial
court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction
has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the
writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights.
Id. at 104-05. Waley v. Johnston was a federal prisoner case, but it and Johnson v. Zerbst
were in due course extended to state prisoners. See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764
(1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
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the federal claim 10 and the failure to exhaust state remedies', were the
two frequently overlapping tests for determining whether to bar or
permit collateral attack. Some operative limitation on collateral attacks was required, and since the res judicata principle had been
regarded as inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings,'12 adequate state
grounds and exhaustion of state remedies filled the bill for some twenty
years.
Fay v. Noia eliminated the adequate state ground test and limited
the exhaustion requirement to state remedies still available. Demise of
the adequate state ground limitation had been foreshadowed in Irvin
v. Dowd,13 a case described as giving district judges "not .

.

. even the

pretense of a governing formulation to be followed."'14 Perhaps mindful of the criticism of Irvin v. Dowd, Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia

gave the federal courts a governing principle to follow. The new
governing principle was waiver. He wrote:
Although we hold that the jurisdiction of the federal courts on
habeas corpus is not affected by procedural defaults incurred by
the applicant during the state court proceedings, we recognize a
limited discretion in the federal judge to deny relief to an applicant
under certain circumstances.

.

.

. We therefore hold that the fed-

eral habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant
who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state
courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies.
But we wish to make very clear that this grant of discretion
is not to be interpreted as a permission to introduce legal fictions
into federal habeas corpus. The classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-"an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"furnishes the controlling standard.

.

.

. At all events we wish it

clearly understood that the standard here put forth depends on the
considered choice of the petitioner.

. . . A choice made by counsel

not participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar
relief.1 5

10 Compare Brown v. Allen with Daniels v. Allen,

both decided in 344 U.S. 443
(1953). Brown obtained habeas corpus relief because he had pursued a state appeal and
had applied to the Supreme Court for certiorari. Daniels, on an identical claim, was
denied habeas corpus relief because his counsel had failed to file a notice of appeal within
the time allowed by the law of North Carolina.
11 See, e.g., Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). The exhaustion requirement was
codified in the 1948 recodification of the Judicial Code and still appears in 28 U.S.C. §
2254(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
12 "All the authorities agree that res judicata does not apply to applications for
habeas corpus." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 (1950).
13 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
14 Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 111 (1959).
15 372 US. at 438-39.
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After Fay v. Noia, Johnson v. Zerbst became one of the all-time
most popular citations of judicial authority. 16 Eight years have elapsed
since the Supreme Court promulgated the waiver standard for the
exercise of discretion to permit collateral attack. 17 It would seem
appropriate to consider whether waiver, as defined in Fay v. Noia and
Johnson v. Zerbst, has proved to be a functional yardstick.
Lest the truly great significance of Fay v. Noia be lost sight of, it
should be pointed out that this discussion focuses on the less important
aspect of that case. Abandonment of the adequate state ground test,
and interpretation of the exhaustion requirement as only presently or
prospectively applicable have had jurisprudential consequences of
immeasurable significance. In 1963, when Fay v. Noia was decided,
the federal courts considered 2,624 habeas corpus petitions from state
prisoners.' 8 In every year thereafter habeas petitions increased drastically until 11,812 such petitions were filed in 1970.19 The sheer increase
in volume resulting from the enlarged habeas jurisdiction undoubtedly contributed to the revolution in standards for criminal
justice wrought by the Warren Court during the sixties, 20 for far
more cases were reaching that Court after being refined through the
district and circuit courts. Moreover, this revolution brought about
its own development of those unfamiliar and perhaps even uncomfortable doctrines, nonretroactivity 2l and 'harmless constitutional
1' A glance at Shepard's Citations will impress the reader with the number of times
the case has been cited.
17 In Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), the same or at least a similar test seems
to have been substituted for the adequate state ground test for the availability of direct
review. See Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1965); Sandalow,
Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine,
1965 SuP. CT. REV. 187; Comment, Supreme Court Treatment of State Procedural Grounds
Relied on in State Courts to Preclude Decision of Federal Questions, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
255 (1961); Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1375 (1961). To the extent that waiver as defined in Johnson v. Zerbst is now an
appropriate consideration on direct as well as collateral review, considerations of functionality are equally applicable.
18 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1970, table 14a.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
21 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See also Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 261 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
The conflict between retroactivity and finality only became of major importance with the Court's decision in Fay v. Noia ....
For the first time, it was
there held that, at least in some instances, a habeas petitioner could successfully
attack his conviction collaterally despite the fact that the "new" rule had not
even been suggested in the original proceedings. Thus, Noia opened the door
for large numbers of prisoners to relitigate their convictions each time a "new"
constitutional rule was announced by this Court.
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error.22 We have not yet seen the full development of the new criminal
law resulting from the enlarged federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
which was the consequence of Fay v. Noia. By eliminating the
adequate state ground as a bar to collateral attack, and by narrowly
construing the exhaustion requirement, that case became and will
remain a landmark.
The test for availability of collateral relief which was substituted
by Fay v. Noia requires separate consideration. The case involved a
conviction after a trial at which a coerced confession was erroneously
admitted in evidence. The independent state ground for barring
relief, failure to appeal, was held not to constitute a waiver. But the
Court did not confine the waiver test to judging the effect of failure to
appeal. It established waiver as the more or less universal test for
availability of federal collateral review. In a footnote to the last
sentence quoted hereinabove, Justice Brennan wrote:
To the extent that any decisions of this Court may be read
to suggest a standard of discretion in federal habeas corpus proceedings different from what we lay down today, such decisions
23
shall be deemed overruled to the extent of any inconsistency.
Now waiver has other meanings, or at least a broader meaning,
than that set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst. It may even be safe to say
that it is a legal expression with no precise meaning. 24 When used in
decisions of courts it is more often than not merely a statement of the
result. Litigants are frequently deemed to have waived a right or objection not because they have consciously foregone its assertion, but
because sound policy commands such a finding. In this sense waiver
is no less a fiction than many others with which lawyers are familiar.
Thus one may well quarrel with Justice Brennan's admonition that the
Fay v. Noia grant of discretion was not to be interpreted as permitting
the introduction of legal fictions into habeas corpus adjudications.
Of course what he had in mind was a particular kind of waiver.
It was to be (1) an intentional relinquishment or abandonment (2) of
a known right or privilege (3) made by the petitioner personally, not
by his counsel alone. But even so, the term used as Justice Brennan
intended invariably states a legal consequence as well as a choice.
Since Fay v. Noia, if a federal habeas court refuses to grant relief
because of some state procedural ground, it must express the legal
consequence of the continued binding effect of the state court judgment
22 Chapman v. California, 386 US. 18 (1967).
Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HAXv. L. Rzv. 814 (1970).
23 372 U.S. at 439 n.44.
24 See J. EWART, WAVm Dhsr tuTr (1917).

See Note, Harmless Constitutional
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in terms of waiver. A more precise term for the legal consequence,
perhaps, is collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment. If an appellate
court refuses to consider an objection to evidence introduced at a
trial because there was no simultaneous objection, it may state the
legal consequence of nonreviewability in terms of waiver by failing to
object. Guilty pleas have frequently been described as waivers. The
legal consequence is a consent judgment of conviction. In Fay v. Noia
the legal consequence of failure to file a timely appeal was the finality,
under state law, of a judgment of conviction. This consequence, which
was rejected by the Supreme Court, may be described as a waiver.
In each of the above instances, however, while the term waiver
states the legal conclusion it also assumes an additional content. That
additional content is the precondition or preconditions for the recognition of the legal consequence. For example, the entry of a guilty plea
in the federal courts may be described as a waiver of a number of
rights. The precondition to the binding effect of such a plea is compliance by the district court with the notice and inquiry requirements
of Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. p.25 Every so-called waiver has two aspects:
(1) a legal consequence, and (2) some preconditions to the recognition
of that legal consequence.
In Fay v. Noia the legal consequence which New York would like
to have attached to petitioner's failure to appeal was the unavailability
of collateral attack on his conviction. The Supreme Court held that
the appropriate precondition to such unavailability was an intentional,
knowledgeable, personal and uncoerced decision on the part of petitioner to forego the appeal.
As applied to the legal consequence to be attached to a failure to
appeal, the Fay v. Noia-Johnson v. Zerbst precondition of waiver, a
free and personal decision not to take some step after notice of the
consequences, was sound enough. Unfortunately, however, the opinion
undertook to impose the same precondition upon every decision on
availability of habeas corpus review without considering whether it
was equally appropriate to all such decisions. Subsequent cases which
have wrestled with the application of this now universal standard have,
I think, demonstrated that it is not universally functional.
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court,
nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not
accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If
a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if
a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
25
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The waiver problem is a separate matter, of course, from the
decision whether or not to permit fact relitigation. Before a district
court can consider the force of a petitioner's claims and the need to
reconsider state court fact findings, 2 it must first decide whether any
collateral attack on the judgment of conviction should be entertained.
That threshold decision according to Fay v. Noia involves, first, the
present unavailability of state court remedies and, next, the absence
of waiver. Rarely is it possible to find in a state court trial record the
preconditions to the legal conclusion of waiver that were specified in
Fay v. Noia. Moreover, a search for waiver in the Fay v. Noia sense may
well divert attention from a consideration of the underlying policy
bases for the various federal constitutional rights which are being
asserted. A personal, knowledgeable, participatory decision may be a
perfectly valid precondition to the waiver of the right to collaterally
attack a judgment entered after a violation of certain federal constitutional rights at some stages in a proceeding. Certain other such rights
may be so significant that even such a personal choice should not be a
bar to collateral attack. With still others, or at other stages in the
criminal justice proceeding, prophylactic policies may militate against
the recognition of even personal participatory waivers. In some cases
waiver should be decided in the light of the authority which an
attorney must be assumed to have in order for the adversary system to
function. Concentration on the personal knowledge and participation
of the defendant petitioner has often led to nonfunctional analysis.
A functional analysis would start with the question, what is the
state ground asserted as a bar to assertion in a collateral proceeding
of the claimed federal right? While the following is not an exhaustive
list, the most common state (or federal) procedural grounds include:
1. a guilty plea;
2. noncompliance with a procedural rule specifying that certain
matters be raised by pretrial motions;
3. noncompliance with the rule requiring contemporaneous
objection to evidence or instructions;
4. failure to comply with time limits on appeal;
5. failure to comply with rules requiring that all grounds for
appeal or other post-conviction relief be specified in the initial
application.
Next one would ask what federal right is claimed to have been violated.
Again without suggesting that this list is exhaustive, the most significant
and commonly asserted violations of federal rights include:
26

See Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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1. unlawful searches and seizures in violation of the fourth
amendment;
2. use of an incriminatory statement obtained in violation of the
fifth amendment;
3. delay in trial in violation of the sixth amendment guarantee
of a speedy trial;
4. failure to afford the assistance of counsel in violation of the
sixth amendment;
5. violation of the right of confrontation guaranteed by the sixth
amendment;
6. denial of the equal availability of remedies such as appeal;
7. incarceration for convictions under invalid statutes in violation
of due process.
Finally, when one of these rights is asserted as a ground for collateral
relief in a habeas corpus case, and one of the above listed state or
federal procedural grounds is asserted as a bar, or waiver, one would
ask what preconditions a district court should impose in its decision
on the waiver issue.
The difficulties resulting from assuming only the Johnson v. Zerbst
preconditions in every case appear most strikingly in guilty plea cases.
Consider, for example, the case of a petitioner who claims ignorance at
the time of his guilty plea of the right to have counsel furnished at the
27
expense of the state. In United States ex rel. Ackerman v. Russell,
such a petitioner acknowledged the court's advice that a lawyer would
be appointed for him, but contended that he believed he would have
to pay for that lawyer. The Third Circuit held that a federal evidentiary
hearing was required to determine the credibility of this assertion as
to petitioner's subjective state of mind. In Schram v. Cupp,28 the
Ninth Circuit considered the same problem. Because the state court
record of a 1952 guilty plea was silent as to whether petitioner was
advised of the right to have counsel furnished without cost, it directed
the issuance of the writ without a federal evidentiary hearing. "Because
the record is silent," wrote Judge Hufstedler, "the burden rested on
Oregon, not Schram, to prove that he had been effectively advised of
his right to court appointed counsel and that, in accordance with the
standards of Johnson v. Zerbst. . . , he had waived that right. ' 29 Since
the state court mistakenly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner
in the state post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the state had not
27 388 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968).
28 425 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1970).
29 Id. at 615.
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carried this burden. Consequently, no federal inquiry into petitioner's
state of mind was required.
With deference to my own colleagues as well as to the Ninth
Circuit, it seems to me that neither court addressed itself to the relevant
issue. A guilty plea results in a consent judgment of conviction. The
preconditions to the binding effect of such a consent judgment should
be discussed not in terms of the defendant's subjective state of mind,
or in terms of who has the burden of proving that state of mind, but in
terms of notice. Waiver, then, in guilty plea cases, would be defined as
an uncoerced choice, made after adequate notice, having the legal
consequence of a binding consent judgment. Assuming this definition
of waiver, Schram is more nearly functional than Russell, for while
Schram speaks of the burden of proving a Johnson v. Zerbst waiver,
realistically it turns on the absence in the state record of notice of the
right to counsel at state expense. Where such notice is in the record, or
can be otherwise proven, it is difficult to see why the petitioner's state
of mind should be relevant. In guilty plea cases the federal habeas
court is fashioning a procedural notice requirement which it will
impose on trial courts as an element of due process. The inquiry
should be what form of notice would be adequate for the ordinary
reasonable man. Imposition of a procedural notice requirement is
precisely what the Supreme Court did in McCarthy v. United States0
and Boykin v. Alabama.81 And because there was a frank recognition
that the court was imposing a new procedural requirement there was
32
no difficulty in holding the requirement to be nonretroactive.
Because the Fay v. Noia test is supposed to be universally applicable, each new pronouncement of a rule of constitutional law in the
field of criminal justice brings to the district courts a blizzard of
petitions from guilty plea prisoners. The typical petition sets out this
syllogism:
1. Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right.
2. At the time of my conviction I was unaware of right X because case X hadn't been decided and case X should be
given retroactive effect.
80

394 U.S. 459 (1969).
81 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
82 Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969). See also Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 747-48 n.4 (1970); United States ex tel. Wiggins v. Pennsylvania, 430 F.2d 650,
652 (3d Cir. 1970); Perry v. Crouse, 429 F.2d 1083, 1085 (10th Cir. 1970); Del Piano v.
United States, 427 F.2d 1156, 1157 (3d Cir. 1970); Moss v. Craven, 427 F.2d 139, 140
(9th Cir. 1970); United States ex tel. Hughes v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1969).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 2:291

3. Ergo my guilty plea did not waive that right and should be set
aside.
Obviously those new decisions which vitally affect the integrity of the
fact-finding process cannot be held to be nonretroactive. Equally
obviously, such decisions cannot be the means for casting doubt upon
the finality of those consent judgments which make up the bulk, perhaps as much as eighty percent, of criminal dispositions. The inutility
of the Fay v. Noia standard for availability of collateral attack might
be expected to cause that standard to yield when confronted by this
practical necessity, and indeed this has been the result. In the 1969
33
term in three cases which already are commonly called the McMann,
Parker,34 Brady35 trilogy, the Court went a long way toward insulating
all guilty pleas from collateral attack on the ground of subsequent
37
change in the law. Justice Brennan 36 and at least one commentator
were unhappy about this new exception to the formerly universal
standard announced in Fay v. Noia. Yet it seems clear that the application of a different standard for availability of collateral relief from
judgments resulting from guilty pleas was not only appropriate but
inevitable. The vital federal interests for which vindication is afforded
under the habeas corpus jurisdiction do not require that every criminal
judgment be subject to collateral attack. When deciding whether
consent judgments resulting from guilty pleas should be subject to
collateral attack, the vital federal interests, it seems to me, are the form
of notice of rights prior to acceptance of the plea, now specified in
McCarthy and Boykin, and the voluntariness of the defendant's consent. 38

In determining in what manner consent to a guilty plea should
be evidenced, consideration of the petitioner's personal participation
83 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
84 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
85 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
36 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justices Douglas
and Marshall joined in this dissent).
87 Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, Foreword: Waiver of ConstitutionalRights:
Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. Ray. 1 (1970).
38 In United States ex rel. Allison v. New Jersey, 418 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), the petitioner, who pleaded non vult, alleged violation of the rule
of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), which held that a defendant's right to
counsel becomes effective upon indictment. Non vult in New Jersey has the practical
effect of a guilty plea. Approaching its effect in terms of waiver, the court was led to
deciding that Massiah was nonretroactive. This conclusion would not have been reached
had a more functional analysis of the preconditions for recognition of guilty pleas been
made. In light of McMann, Parker, and Brady, the issue of retroactivity of Massiah in
the Third Circuit should not have been decided.
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is of course highly relevant. His choice must be free from coercion. 9
But must the choice, as Fay v. Noia suggests, be that of petitioner and
not that of his attorney? Here, again, discussion of the problem in terms
of waiver, without separating the legal consequence aspect of waiver
from the precondition aspect, tends to cloud analysis. The precondition
aspect involves the scope of the attorney's authority. The consequences
of a guilty plea are so drastic and far-reaching that unless some overriding interest in the functioning of the adversary system compels otherwise, consent to its entry should be deemed to be beyond the scope of an
attorney's actual or implied authority. There is no such overriding
interest. Requiring a personal choice by defendant in open court before
a guilty plea will be deemed valid imposes no great burden on the
criminal justice system. This does not mean that every decision, or
even every important decision, during each stage of the criminal
process, should be beyond the attorney's implied authority.
By emphasizing the personal participation of the petitioner, the
waiver test announced in Fay v. Noia seems virtually to eliminate any
implied authority in an attorney. This is puzzling, for since Gideon v.
Wainwright40 recognized the essential role that a legal tactician plays in
the processes of criminal justice, the requirements for participation of
counsel at the pre-trial4 x and post-trial4 2 stages have steadily been
expanded. Why should all tactical choices be personal? Should the often
emotional reactions of a criminal defendant weigh, in all cases, more
heavily than the judgment of a well-informed and well-prepared attorney? The answer to each of these questions varies, I suggest, with
the stage of the proceedings and the legal consequence attaching to a
given course of conduct.
Brookhart v. Janis43 illustrates the problem of the scope of an
attorney's authority. The state practice permitted a procedure called
39 Sims v. Georgia, 389 US. 404 (1967); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Davis v.
North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
40 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
41 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
(lineup cases).
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobeda v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); (interrogation cases).
42 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Petitioners, being indigent, applied for
appointment of counsel to assist in their appeal. When the court of appeals denied the
request and heard the appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on equal protection grounds.
48 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
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a prima facie trial, in which the defendant put the state to its proof of
the elements of the offense, but did not put in a defense or confront
or cross-examine witnesses. Against defendant's express wishes his
counsel consented to such a trial. The Supreme Court ordered habeas
corpus relief from the resulting conviction. Writing for the Court
Justice Black emphasized that petitioner had not personally waived
a full trial. Justice Harlan, concurring, wrote:
I believe a lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of
how to run a trial even in the face of his client's incomprehension
or even explicit disapproval. The decision, for example, whether
or not to cross-examine a specific witness is, I think, very clearly
one for counsel alone. Although it can be contended that the waiver
here was nothing more than a tactical choice of this nature, I believe for federal constitutional purposes the procedure agreed to
in this instance involved so significant a surrender of the rights
normally incident to a trial that it amounted almost to a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere. And I do not believe that under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
such a plea may be
44
entered by counsel over his client's protest.
The issue, in other words, was the scope of the attorney's implied
authority. Implying authority to enter a guilty plea without the actual
consent of the defendant is not required by the practical necessities of
the adversary system. A state rule recognizing such implied authority
safeguards no important public interest and should not be recognized
in the federal courts as a bar to litigation of a claimed federal constitutional right.
Most collateral attacks on guilty pleas can be discussed and decided
in terms either of notice or of authority. Once a policy decision is
made about the form and content of notice, and about the degree of
personal rather than agency participation required before a guilty plea
should be accepted, waiver merely states the conclusion. One situation
comes to mind, however, where analysis in terms of notice and authority
might preclude relief otherwise warranted. That is the case of a petitioner confined as a result of a guilty plea to a statute later held to be
invalid, as applied to such a defendant, for constitutional or other
deficiencies. Examples presenting the problem are guilty pleas to the
gambling tax stamp, firearms registration and marijuana transfer tax
acts. 45 Such cases may present these factual patterns: the guilty plea may
be by an unrepresented defendant who received the full notice of rights
Id. at 8-9.
See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S.
85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); and Marchetti v. United States, 590
U.S. 39 (1968).
44

45
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required by McCarthy and Boykin, and who chose to remain unrepresented. It may be by a represented defendant whose attorney did
not anticipate the decisions in Marchetti, Grosso, Haynes or Leary. 46
It may be by a represented defendant who although his attorney anticipated that the statute might be constitutionally defective and so advised
him, nevertheless entered a guilty plea. In any of the foregoing cases the
guilty plea may be the result of a plea bargain resulting in the acceptance of a plea to a downgraded offense.
Analysis of the collateral estoppel effect of such guilty pleas in
terms of waiver is not helpful. Applying the Fay v. Noia standard the
line would be drawn between clients represented by the lawyer with
foresight and the lawyer without it. The defendant who made the
informed choice would be barred from relief while his less informed
celImate would be set free. But suppose that in the case of the informed
defendant there was no plea bargain, whereas in the case of the uninformed defendant there was. Perhaps the court in the latter case
would impose a new precondition of waiver; something perhaps in the
nature of consideration for a bargained for disposition.
A more functional analysis would ask what competing interests

are at stake. The federal constitutional interest is our abhorrence, from
a due process viewpoint, of the incarceration of any defendant convicted
under a statute which did not properly make his conduct criminal. The
competing policy is the need to insulate guilty pleas, entered voluntarily after the prescribed notice, from collateral attack resulting from
changes in the law. Both of these competing interests are applicable to
each of the hypothetical guilty pleas. There is no compelling reason for
choosing between these interests on the basis of the defendant's personal knowledge. Habeas corpus relief can, in each of the hypothetical
cases, be grounded in the older notion of "want of jurisdiction . . .or

some other matter rendering the proceedings void. '47 Affording relief
on that basis is not inconsistent with Fay v. Noia. The federal court
might then decide whether a line should be drawn between bargained
for downgraded pleas and others. A strong argument can be made in
favor of making a defendant live up to a plea bargain even when that
results in his incarceration under an unconstitutional statute. But the
government obtains substantial benefits from the plea bargaining
process. In view of those substantial benefits it may be entirely reasonable that it bear the risk that the statute to which it accepts a plea
may later be held void. When deciding between these competing
40 See note 45 supra.
47 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879).
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interests, a quest for waiver, as defined in Fay v. Noia, will not be
helpful and may well be obscurant.
In guilty plea habeas corpus cases, summarizing, the availability
of collateral attack should turn on the answers to these questions:
1. Was the statute proscribing the conduct which the guilty plea
admitted a valid statute as applied to the defendant?
2. Did the defendant receive the minimum notice of rights
prescribed by the Supreme Court as a due process requirement?
3. Was the guilty plea the defendant's own personal decision
rather than a plea made by and resting on the implied authority of his attorney?
If these standards were met the federal court should decline to issue
the writ. Stating that conclusion in terms of waiver would do nothing
to enlighten either the petitioner or the bar as to its reasons, but
would, in view of the definition of that term set forth in Fay v. Noia,
compel inquiry into the petitioner's state of mind, which except on the
issue of voluntariness is inappropriate.
The problem of the attorney's authority as a precondition to
waiver also arises in attacks on judgments of conviction following a
trial. Concentration on the personal participatory waiver standard of
Fay v. Noia has in many such cases led courts to ignore that problem.
United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz 48 provides an example.
In a case arising prior to Jackson v. Denno,49 the defendant's attorney
failed to object at trial to the admission of petitioner's confession. The
state court found that no objection was made because the statement
contained exculpatory as well as incriminatory materials. The district
court, without an evidentiary hearing, declined to issue the great writ.
The court of appeals reversed, saying:
Undoubtedly, the record is capable of supporting the hypothesis
that no objection was made by counsel for tactical reasons. On the
other hand, it is equally capable of supporting the appellant's assertion that he had no part in counsel's decision not to object. 50
The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on waiver, that is,
on petitioner's personal participation in counsel's decision. But when
this question is answered, what of constitutional significance will we
48 413 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1969). A similar example is United States ex rel. Gockley v.
Myers, 378 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1967). But see United States ex rel. LaMolinare v. Duggan,
415 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1969).
49 378 U.S. 368 (1964), holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to a fair
hearing to determine the voluntariness of his confession.
50 413 F.2d at 502.
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know? The federal constitutional right being asserted is the privilege
against self-incrimination. At a minimum the court should inquire
whether any normally competent attorney would properly advise the
defendant, in the circumstances of the case, not to object. Even if the
attorney did obtain his client's consent, the federal policy favoring
vindication of the privilege against self-incrimination would remain,
at least if the attorney's advice was egregiously unsound.
A rule requiring that attorneys obtain the consent of clients with
respect to the admission of evidence during the course of trial is impractical, given the nature of the adversary process. That process is
enshrined in other constitutional provisions. When the case enters the
guilt determining stage, the sixth amendment right to counsel can be
made to function effectively only if the courts presume a certain
amount of implied authority in the attorney. The focus of inquiry in
the adversary stages of criminal justice proceedings should be upon the
scope of the attorney's implied authority, not upon the degree of the
defendant's knowledge or participation. Objections to the admission
of evidence, objections to the court's charge, decisions on what evidence
to offer, decisions to make or withhold a motion for a mistrial, are all
matters which, if counsel is to function in the adversary system, must
be deemed to be within his implied authority.
This is not to say that all such decisions by counsel should be
beyond review by a federal habeas court. It is to say, rather, that the
most relevant inquiry is the competence and integrity with which the
agent attorney discharged his duty. Movement in the direction of such
a focus of inquiry can be seen in the recent case of Moore v. United
States,5' which modified the rule in the Third Circuit for judging the
adequacy of counsel from the "mockery of justice" test to that of
"normal competency." In the operation of the criminal justice system
any government should, as a matter of due process, be required to
52
assure that much representation to all defendants.
Assuming that the attorney's performance was within the range
of normal competency, another relevant inquiry should be whether
the procedural bar asserted by the state is sufficiently related to the
necessities of the adversary system that its imposition does not offend
due process. The contemporaneous objection rule and the time limits
for filing a notice of appeal are obvious examples of procedural bars
51 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970). See also United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle,
434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970).
52 Nor would I draw the line, in applying the normal competency test, between
retained attorneys and those furnished at public expense. But see United States ex rel.
O'Brien v. Maroney, 423 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1970).
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which are intimately so related. More troublesome is a rule by which
an unruly defendant may be barred from confronting the witnesses
against him by being excluded from the courtroom. In United States
ex rel. Allen v. Illinois53 the Seventh.Circuit said:

No conditions may be imposed on the absolute right of a criminal
defendant to be present at all stages of the proceeding. The insistence of a defendant that he exercise this right
under unreason54
able conditions does not amount to a waiver.
The Supreme Court disagreed, saying:
Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst,
•

.

. we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right

to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge
that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior,
he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so dis-

orderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. 55
56
The decision has been described as involving waiver by conduct.
Actually it decides that a procedural rule permitting a trial to proceed
in the absence of an unruly defendant is so obviously related to the
necessities of the adversary system that it does not offend due process.
Only after first determining that the rule permitting his exclusion is
reasonably necessary5 7 can one say that Allen waived being present at
his trial by his unruly conduct.
Thus, in deciding the availability of collateral attack on a judgment of conviction after trial in the face of a state or federal procedural
requirement asserted as a bar to consideration of a federal claim, the
habeas court should look not at what the defendant knew or did, but
at what his attorney did. It should turn the availability of collateral
relief on the answer to these questions:
413 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 235.
55 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
56 Note, Right of Confrontation-Defendant's Conduct as Waiver of Right to Be
Present, 2 SErON HALL L. REV. 226 (1970); see Tigar, supra note 37.
57 The approach here suggested might have produced a different result in Miller v.
California, 392 U.S. 616 (1968). There the state law required that an objection to the
testimony of a witness on Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), (see note 38
supra) grounds first made out of the presence of the jury and ruled upon must be
renewed when the witness is on the stand in the presence of the jury. The Supreme
Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Three Justices joined
Justice Marshall's dissent, in which he discussed whether or not the failure to object was
a waiver. The issue really was whether the California second objection rule was reasonably
necessary for the orderly conduct of a trial. It is hard to see why such a rule should be
necessary.
53

54
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1. Was the tactical decision which resulted in the procedural bar
one which, in light of the necessities of the adversary system,
should be within the implied authority of the attorney?
2. Is the procedural bar (for example, the simultaneous objection
rule) reasonably necessary for the functioning of the adversary
system?
3. Was the tactical decision within the range of normal competency for representation of criminal defendants?
By focusing first on implied authority, the habeas court will be
more likely to consider carefully whether or not the procedural bar is
one reasonably necessary for the operation of the adversary system since
the two questions are somewhat interrelated. In guilty plea cases, in
contrast, there is no impelling reason why defendant's personal participation should not be required. Some pretrial decisions should be
treated in a similar manner since their significance may be great, and
the burden on the courts of requiring personal participation slight.
58
One such decision that comes to mind is the waiver of a jury trial.
Others, while significant in effect, may be both technical in nature and
so directly related to the orderly functioning of the adversary system
that they should be considered within the scope of the attorney's
implied authority. For example, a notice of alibi may be required by
state law, and its absence may have a serious precluding effect. 59 Certainly a decision on the recognition in a habeas case of such a state
procedural rule should not turn on the degree of the defendant's
knowledge or participation. If the state rule is not so clearly unrelated
to a valid requirement of the adversary system as to violate due process,60
58 See, e.g., the following jury trial waiver cases: Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 748 (1970); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298, 312 (1930). See also ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY, Part I. 2(b), and
Commentary at 37-39 (Tent. Draft May 1968).
59 See, e.g., N.J.R. 3:11-1, Notice of Alibi; Particulars, which provides in part:
If a defendant intends to rely in any way on an alibi, he shall, on written
demand of the prosecuting attorney and within 10 days thereafter, furnish a
written bill of particulars, signed by him, stating the specific place or places at
which he claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names
and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such
alibi.
60 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80-86 (1970), treating a petitioner's constitutional objections to the Florida notice of alibi rule:
Given the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in
protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate.
Id. at 81. As for petitioner's contention that the rule required him to furnish the
state with information that would be useful in convicting him, thus violating his right
against self-incrimination, the court said:
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compliance or noncompliance should be held to be within the attorney's implied authority. His failure to comply should be judged against
the standard of normal competency.
The approach suggested here, by focusing first on what matters
should be held to be within an attorney's implied authority, would
recognize the important and necessary role the attorney plays in most
stages of the adversary system. At the same time frank recognition that
departure from normal competency is in all cases a ground for habeas
corpus relief would require close attention to the actual effect of the
asserted procedural bar on the claimed federal right. Such an approach
would be more likely both to assure strict compliance with federally
imposed minimum standards of criminal justice and to achieve individually fair results than the elusive search for personal participatory
waiver.
When the asserted bar to habeas relief is petitioner's failure to
appeal, the threshold problem, as with guilty pleas, is the form of
notice. Nelson v. Peyton"' is a case in which the court, while using the
conventional waiver language, actually decided a form of notice issue.
There an indigent petitioner, who was represented at trial by assigned
counsel, failed to appeal. Neither his attorney nor the court informed
him of his right to appeal or his right to be represented by assigned
counsel. The absence of such notice was the operative circumstance
upon which issuance of the writ turned. The conclusion was stated as
absence of waiver. Contrast that case with United States ex rel. O'Brien
v. Maroney, 2 in which a privately retained attorney told his client
there was a right to appeal but that in his opinion an appeal would be
futile. Neither the attorney nor the defendant, who by this time was
indigent, took any steps to perfect an appeal. No one informed the
3 to have counsel
defendant of his right, under Douglas v. California,"
appointed. In the district court the writ was denied on the basis of
waiver, a waiver that in the Fay v. Noia sense was invalid since defendant was not personally aware of his right to assigned counsel. The
Third Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that the failure of privately
retained counsel to notify defendant of his rights was not such state
action as is required to bring the case within the reach of the fourteenth
We decline to hold that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
guarantees the defendant the right to surprise the State with an alibi defense.
Id. at 86.
01 415 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1969).
62 423 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1970).
63 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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amendment.6 4 But was the defendant O'Brien any less in need of notice
now specified by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2)65 than the defendant
Nelson? And if such notice was clearly appropriate was it not a
departure from normal competency for the privately retained attorney
not to have given it?66

The imposition on the state courts, at least prospectively, of a
duty to give notice similar to that required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2)
would serve a useful purpose. The problem of retroactivity could be
handled by judging the notice actually given, by privately retained and
publicly furnished attorneys alike, by the standard of normal competency. The normal competency standard would, moreover, not bar
relief where an attorney, contrary to his client's wishes, abandoned or
neglected an appeal. 67 In those extreme cases where the notice of rights
was adequate and the attorney's performance satisfactory, but injustice
remained, relief might still be available on the ground that the defendant's decision not to appeal was psychologically coerced. That, indeed,
may be the precise limit of the holding in Fay v. Noia.
Dissenting in that famous case, Justice Harlan wrote: "Looked at
from any angle, the concept of waiver which the court has created must
be found wanting." 68 This judgment is perhaps too harsh. Justice
Black, too, has considered the waiver test unsatisfactory. Dissenting in
Kaufman v. United States,69 he suggests "that the defendant's guilt
or innocence is at least one of the vital considerations in determining
whether collateral relief should be available to a convicted defendant."
Such a rule would unduly impede the prophylactic role of the federal
habeas courts in the ongoing task of reforming the criminal justice
process. But it does seem clear that as the sole functional test for
determining availability of habeas corpus collateral relief, absence of
64 This holding was consistent with prior Third Circuit decisions. United States ex
rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller. 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1963); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy,
203 F.2d 407, 426 (3d Cir. 1953). But see United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d
648 (2d Cir. 1969).
65 (2) Notification of Right to Appeal. After imposing sentence in a case which
has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of
his right to appeal and of the right of a person who is unable to pay the cost of
an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. If the defendant so
requests, the clerk of the court shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal
on behalf of the defendant.
66 The author acknowledges that he shares responsibility for United States ex rel.
O'Brien v. Maroney, 423 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1970), which he now so ungraciously criticizes.
67 Such a standard would have afforded relief to Daniels as well as to Brown. See
note 10 supra.
68 372 U.S. at 472.
69 394 U.S. 217, 235-36 (1968).
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the kind of waiver defined in Fay v. Noia and Johnson v. Zerbst, has
left much to be desired. The McMann, Parker,Brady trilogy suggests
that a different test is now applicable to guilty plea cases. It is quite unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever again acquiesce in
state imposed procedural bars to the vindication of federal constitutional rights. Yet there are indications that in a tentative way the federal
courts are groping for more meaningful standards for availability of
collateral attack than those announced in Fay v. Noia. Some such
standards are suggested by this paper. Judges, litigants and scholars
undoubtedly will improve on these. Their approach should be to search
for pragmatic limitations on habeas corpus relitigation which will
focus attention on the practical necessities of the adversary system and
on the central role of the attorney in that system.

